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Admiralty
By David F. Sipple*

I.

INTRODUCTION

During this survey period, the Fifth Circuit interpreted important principles of maritime law. The circuit continued to remain active in the controversial and very fluid area of the maritime law relating to damages
available to wrongful death beneficiaries. The appeals court answered a
question left open in the en banc opinion in Ivy v. Security Barge Lines,
Inc.,' by subsequently holding that, when a seaman's death in state territorial waters is caused by unseaworthiness, the survivors of the seaman
may recover damages for loss of society under the general maritime law in
addition to any recovery available under the Jones Act.'
In the area of benefits available to claimants in maritime personal injury cases, the Supreme Court handed down a significant decision in
American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 8 which held that the wife of a
nonfatally injured harbor worker has a remedy under the general maritime law for loss of her husband's society. The Supreme Court's maritime
activity also included settling a dispute among the circuits over whether a
stevedore-employer that pays compensation to a harbor worker who is
injured on board a vessel and sues the shipowner for negligence is required to share the harbor worker's litigation costs. The issue was answered in the negative in Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,4 in
which the Court held that under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work* Partner in the law firm of Chamlee, Dubus, Sipple & Walter, Savannah, Georgia, University of Georgia (A.B., 1966; M.P.A., 1969); Mercer University (J.D., 1972). Member Savannah and American Bar Associations; State Bar of Georgia; The Maritime Law Association of the United States; The Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute.
1. 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). See Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.
1980); Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980), and see Part IV, Wrongful Death,
especially text accompanying notes 60-75, infra.
3. 446 U.S. 274 (1980). See Part V, Harbor Worker Claims, especially text accompanying
notes 83-100, infra.
4. 445 U.S. 74 (1980).
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ers' Compensation Act,5 the stevedore-employer was not required to share
the claimant's litigation costs by having its stevedore's lien proportionately reduced.
In editing the cases for this survey, we have omitted opinions in which
the appeal was concerned largely with a review of factual findings of a
jury for a trial court. Other cases have been eliminated because of space
considerations. We have attempted to focus on opinions which interpret
what in our view represent important principals of maritime law. Some of
our footnotes have been expanded in an effort to place in context the
points discussed in the cases. Additionally, several Supreme Court cases
decided during the survey period have been included because of the significant role which the Court plays in formulating the maritime law of
this country.
II. FOREJGN SEAMEN
The literal terms of the Jones Act do not require either the parties or
the injury to have any connection with the United States as a prerequisite
for suit in this country.6 However, the courts have long held that Jones
Act jurisdiction is subject to limitations.7 When a foreign seaman or his
representative brings an action in a United States court under the Jones
Act or general maritime law, the court must determine initially the choice
of law question-whether to apply United States law or the law of some
foreign nation. 8 The factors to be considered in making the choice have
been set forth by the Supreme Court in the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis
trilogy.' The now familiar seven criteria were set forth in Lauritzen as a
guide in determining whether there are sufficient contacts with this country to justify application of United States rather than foreign law. 10 Since
the plaintiff in Lauritzen had pleaded only the Jones Act and had not
joined counts based upon general maritime law, it was left to the decision
in Romero to hold that the principles set forth in Lauritzen apply equally
to suits brought under the general maritime law, and the same choice of
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
6. The Jones Act provides as follows: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in
the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury ...
." 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
7. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
8. Yohanes v. Ayers S.S. Co., 451 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919
(1971).
9. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
10. The criteria are: (1) place of wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; (7) law of the forum. 345 U.S. at 571-92.
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law criteria should be employed."1 The most recent contribution of the
Supreme Court in this area is the Rhoditis case, which involved a Greek
seaman injured in New Orleans on board a Greek ship owned by a Greek
corporation. Suit was brought in federal court in Louisiana. The facts
showed that almost all the stock in the Greek shipowner corporation was
held by a United States resident alien who managed the corporation from
New York."5 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated that, since
the shipowner's base of operations was located in this country, United
States law should apply. The substantial business operation was so
clearly linked to this country that the Court found it appropriate to
pierce the corporate veil and look to the actual stock ownership.18
If the court determines that United States law does not apply, it will
then exercise its discretion either to dismiss the case or to retain jurisdiction and apply foreign law.14 One basis for retaining jurisdiction may be
that the plaintiff has no other available forum.15 For this reason, the
court has developed the practice of staying the proceedings to allow
plaintiff time to pursue his remedy in the foreign forum, and has required
defendants to agree that they will not raise jurisdictional objections and
statutes of limitation defenses in the action which the plaintiff brings in
the foreign country.1 6 Another factor which has persuaded courts to retain jurisdiction is the assertion by the foreign seaman of a bona fide
wage claim under the federal statute protecting the rights of seamen to
receive their earned wages while in a United States port.1 7 It has been
held that the fact that the court must decide such a wage claim is a factor
which properly may be considered in determining whether to retain jurisdiction, in order that the seaman may be awarded complete relief in one
suit.180
In Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V.,19 the Fifth Circuit had occasion to deal
with choice of law and forum non conveniens principles in a case involving a Greek seaman killed in Beaumont, Texas, while serving on a Greek
vessel which was owned by a Liberian corporation and operated by a Pan11. 358 U.S. at 382.
12. 398 U.S. at 307.
13. Id. at 310.
14. Anastasiadis v. Steamship Little John, 346 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965). This issue is
normally decided on forum non conveniens principles. Yohanes v. Ayers S.S. Co., 451 F.2d
349, 350 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1971).
15. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 589-90 (1953).
16. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975); Paper Operations
Consultants Int'l, Ltd v. Steamship Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1975).
17. The statute expressly provides for application to seamen on foreign vessels while in
United States ports. 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1976).
18. See, e.g., The Fletero v. Arias, 206 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1953).
19. 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980).
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amanian corportion. A ship's boiler exploded, causing a fire, and the seaman was trapped in the engine room where he suffocated from carbon
dioxide. The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's holding that the
Jones Act and general maritime law should be applied and that jurisdiction should be retained.20 In analyzing the choice of law issue, the appellate court took its direction from Rhoditis and held that the choice depended upon the substantiality of the contacts between the shipowner's
operations and the United States. 1 Judge Tate upheld the finding of the
district court that the shipowner's contacts were substantial in that the
vessel's entire service under its present ownership and all its revenues
arose from a United States base of operations. The facts of the case
showed that the vessel had recently been purchased and had sailed from
Spain to Beaumont to load corn for delivery to the Soviet Union. She was
on her maiden voyage to the United States for the new owner. The court
felt that, since the vessel's entire service for the owner was in United
States trade, this fact alone was substantial enough to justify application
of United States law. In an effort to bolster its opinion, the court held
that the district court's determination of whether or not a shipowner has
a substantial base of operations in the United States is protected under
the clearly erroneous rule.2"

Since the Agios Nicolaos V. was on its first voyage to the United States
under the new owner, the Fifth Circuit's application of the "base of operations" approach seems to focus more on the number of vessel voyages
into the United States rather than the extent of the shipowner's management operations in this country. Apparently there was no finding of actual management of the vessel from the United States."s Judge Tate's
20. Id. at 312.
21. It has been held that the task of a court in deciding the choice of law issue is not to
weigh or balance present against absent contacts, but merely to ascertain whether the contacts which are present are substantial. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d
437, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1959). An example is the Rhoditis case, in which the court decided the
Jones Act should apply although the majority of contacts favored foreign law.
22. 628 F.2d at 318. In his dissent from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc,
Chief Judge Brown stated that there were legal issues involved in the lower court's holding
that ". . . may not be ignored, overlooked, or watered down by any such distortion. . . "of
the clearly erroneous rule. Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V., 636 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1981).
23. Rhoditis itself appears to give mixed signals as to whether the "base of operations" is
to be tested by where the shipowner conducted management operations or where its vessel
operations in terms of voyages occurred. Justice Douglas called for " . . . a cold objective
look at the actual operational contacts that this ship and its owner have with the United
States," 398 U.S. at 310, thus suggesting both inquiries are relevant. But the critical factor
for Douglas appears in the following passage:
We see no reason whatsoever to give the Jones Act a strained construction so that
this alien owner, engaged in an extensive business operation in this country, may
have an advantage over citizens engaged in the same business by allowing him to
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opinion is broadly written and, despite a disclaimer," the court seems to
have shifted the emphasis from United States control or operation to the
presence of a foreign flag vessel in a United States port.
In a stinging dissent from the court's denial of a petition for rehearing
en banc, Chief Judge Brown stated that if the panel's reasoning is valid,
it means that every injury and death involving foreign seamen occurring
in a United States port during the vessel's first voyage to this country
would invoke American law.' 5 According to the Chief Judge, something
more than one call or even regular calls is required. In his view, the holding portends the opening of all American courts to the hundreds of
thousands of foreign seamen for disposition of their claims for injury and
death fortuitously occurring within United States waters as their vessels
call in this country from time to time.'*
Although the Fifth Circuit stated in its opinion in Fisher that once a
court determined, through choice of law considerations, to apply United
States law, this should end further inquiry and jurisdiction should be retained, 27 the panel nevertheless went on to consider the forum non conveniens issues relevant to the question of retention of jurisdiction."
Judge Tate had little difficulty disposing of the question, finding more
escape the obligations and responsibility of a Jones Act "employer."
398 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).
24. The court disclaimed any intimation to hold that doing"... any amount of business in a U.S. port, however minor, is alone sufficient to establish a 'substantial base of
operations'." 628 F.2d at 317 n.17.
25. With respect to the court's argument that the vessel's entire service and revenues
under its present owner arose from a United States base of operations, the Chief Judge
countered with the view that the same could be said for any ship coming into a United
States port on its maiden voyage in order to load cargo. Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V., 636
F.2d at 1109. For the Chief Judge, the clear implication of the holding is that all that is
required to trigger a foreign seaman's right to Jones Act coverage is the presence of his
vessel to load cargo on a single voyage to the United States. Id. at 1108.
26. Id. at 1111.
27. 628 F.2d at 313, 315. It is submitted that the broad language employed by the court
in setting forth this proposition is perhaps unfortunate as susceptible of being taken to
apply to non-seamen's cases. However, a careful reading of the opinion makes clear that the
court is focusing its aim on seamen's cases rather than others in which forum non conveniens issues may arise. 628 F.2d at 313 n.7, 314 n.11. Application of such a rigid rule in
cases such as cargo claims involving shipments in foreign commerce to which the United
States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976), necessarily
applies would present impossible results. It would mean that, in every case of cargo going to
or from the United States to which COGSA would apply, the court would have no discretion
to decline jurisdiction, no matter how insubstantial the United States contacts. In such
cases, application of United States law in the form of COGSA should be simply one of the
factors which the court may consider in determining the discretionary jurisdictional issue.
See 2A BNzncr ON ADmnmALT § 51 (6th ed. 1977).
28. 628 F.2d at 313.
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than sufficient bases to satisfy the standard that jurisdiction should be
retained unless to do so would result in an injustice.2' The court was persuaded by the fact that investigations had been conducted by American
agencies, substantial steps toward adjudication had been taken in the
United States forum, and the decedent's representative was asserting a
bona fide wage claim.80
III.

JONES AcT SEAMEN

While a seaman enjoys an unusually favored position in the maritime
law, s1 seldom is he afforded such complete judicial protection as when he
has fallen or jumped overboard from a vessel. Under the "marine rescue
doctrine," the shipowner has an obligation to employ every reasonable
means to effect a rescue consistent with the safety of the vessel and the
crew.82 There are two branches of the doctrine. Under the search and rescue branch, which applies when the seaman has apparently fallen overboard but his location in the water is unknown, the ship's officers are
obliged both to rescue the seaman and to effect a search of the area traversed by the ship so long as it is reasonably possible that the seaman
remains alive. 8s Under the second branch, which applies when the seaman
falls or jumps overboard but remains visible, the officers have a duty to
use every reasonable means to recover him."
The extent of judicial protection for a seaman overboard was illustrated
by the Fifth Circuit in Reyes v. Vantage Steamship Co."s Simply stated,
29. It is submitted that the two cases relied on by the panel as setting forth the standard
to be applied-Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v. The M/S Netuno, 474 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.
1973) and Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.
1956)-speak only to the standard to be employed in in rem cases for determining whether
a district court should exercise jurisdiction (i.e., whether defendant has shown that exercising jurisdiction will result in an injustice), and they have no application to in personam
cases such as Fisher. This standard is based on the principle that a suitor possessing a
maritime lien against a vessel is traditionally allowed to proceed in rem in the jurisdiction
where the vessel may be found. Motor Distributors, 239 F.2d at 467; Poseidon Schiflahrt,
G.M.B.H., 474 F.2d at 204, 205 n.6.
30. 628 F.2d at 313.
31. The seaman's celebrated status as a "ward of the admiralty" is based upon the nature of his employment, which involves a surrender of personal liberty, almost complete
dependence on the shipowner for his care and safety, and extreme hazards inherent in duty
at sea. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
32. It has been held this obligation is implied in the seaman's contract. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R. 50 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1931).
33. 1B BzNEDcr ON AnuALrY § 30 (7th ed. 1975).
34. Id.
35. 609 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1980). The opinion was written after a rehearing following the
court's original decision in 1977. (558 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1977).) See Chamlee, Admiralty,
1977 Fifth Circuit Survey, 29 MERczR L. Rv. 899, 909-10 (1978), for a discussion of the
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a drunk seaman decided to take a swim in the ocean, jumped overboard,
and drowned while trying to swim to a mooring buoy. Although crew
members saw the seaman and were aware he was in trouble, no effort to
rescue was made. In reversing a judgment for the shipowner, the court
rejected the view that, in cases in which a seaman deliberately jumps
overboard, the shipowner's duty to rescue commences only as of the time
the seaman begins to drown or lets out a yell for help. Chief Judge Brown
stated that such a "one-yell" rule would be contrary to the underlying
rationale of the marine rescue doctrine and suggested that the ship's officers at least have a duty to make preparations for a rescue when a seaman jumps overboard.3s
The shipowner's breach of duty to rescue was established on the basis
of a violation of a Coast Guard regulation requiring the vessel to have on
board a rocket powered line-throwing appliance which "could" have been
used to deliver a line to the seaman. Chief Judge Brown was unconcerned
by the fact that such appliances are normally employed to pass lines from
ship to shore or from ship to ship and not to rescue men in the water,
stating that it was sufficient to establish a breach of duty that the appliance "might" have been used to effect a rescue.8 ' With regard to the element of causation, the Fifth Circuit instructed that on remand the shipowner was to have the burden of proving that the regulatory violation
could not have been a contributing cause of the seaman's death. " This
reversal of the normal burden of proving causation was justified on the
basis that, in light of the high standard of diligence imposed on vessels in
rescue situations, it would be unfair to place on the seaman's widow the
task of refuting the expected contention of the shipowner that, despite its
negligence, there would have been insufficient time and means to save the
seaman. Chief Judge Brown found further support for such an allocation
of the burden of proof by analogy to the "Pennsylvania Rule," normally
applied in collision cases, under which a shipowner cast in fault for violation of a statute designed to prevent collisions must, in order to escape
liability, prove that the violation could not have caused the collision.8 '
first opinion.
36. 609 F.2d at 143.
37. Id. In Jones Act cases it has been held that, if violation of a safety regulation contributes to an injury, the shipowner is negligent per se without regard to whether the injury
which occurs is of the kind which the regulation was designed to prevent. See Kernan v.
American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
38. 609 F.2d at 146.
39. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1873). The rule provides in full that a
shipowner cast in violation of a statute designed to prevent collisions at sea must bear the
burden of proving not merely that the violation might not have been one of the causes, or

that it probably was not, but that it could not have been. Although described by Professors
Gilmore and Black as a "drastic and unusual presumption," G. Gn.MoRE & C. BLACK, THu
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Courts traditionally have displayed great solicitude toward seamen and
their contractual relationships. The scrutiny given to releases executed by
seamen differs markedly from that given to settlement documents signed
by other workers.40 The basic principle applied in a seaman's release case
is that the burden is on the shipowner to prove the seaman had an informed understanding of his legal rights and a clear appreciation of the
consequences of signing the release.4' The accuracy or inaccuracy of a
medical diagnosis of the seaman's illness, and the seaman's appreciation
of it, also play an important role in determining the validity of a release,
as illustrated in Charpentier v. Fluor Ocean Services, Inc.42 Seaman
Jerry Charpentier fell and injured his knee while working on a defendant's barge and was treated by an orthopedic specialist. During a period
of treatment and rehabilitation, the seaman negotiated a settlement for
twenty thousand dollars and later executed a release prepared by defendant's attorney. Before the signing, the attorney carefully advised Charpentier of his rights under the law.' 3 Unfortunately, the seaman continued to have problems with his knee and was obliged to undergo two
subsequent operations. He filed a Jones Act suit for the injuries sustained
in his fall, and the district court granted a summary judgment for defendant on the basis of the prior release.
On appeal, Charpentier argued that, because his knee injury lingered
longer than expected and required additional medical treatment, the trial
court should have found that a mutual mistake of fact had been made
and have set aside the release. Although recognizing the general rule that
a mistaken diagnosis can provide the basis for invalidating a seaman's
LAw oF ADnuLALTY 494 (2d ed. 1975), the rule has not been applied to require a shipowner
to prove that the violation "could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have had a causal
relation to the collision, no matter how speculative, improbable or remote." China Union
Lines, Ltd. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769, 782 (5th Cir. 1966). The rule has been
applied in some circuits to cases not involving maritime collisions: In re Seaboard Shipping
Corp., 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972) (applied in marine
rescue case); Commercial Transport Corp. v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 374 F.2d 813 (7th Cir.
1967) (applied to barge fire); The Fort Fetterman v. South Carolina State Highway Dept.,
268 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1959) (ship-bridge collision); The Denali, 105 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1939)
(vessel stranding). However, the Fifth Circuit apparently has not yet done so. See discussion
in Garner v. Cities Serv. Tankers Corp., 456 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1972).
40. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (1st Cir. 1823). For a short discussion of the
legal issues involved in seamen's releases, see Sipple, Admiralty, 1979 Fifth Circuit Survey,
31 Mancan L. Rav. 825, 833-34 (1980).
41. Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1971).
42. 613 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. Id. at 83. As is sometimes done as a precautionary measure, the defendant's attorney
arranged for a. court reporter to be present at the settlement and to transcribe the proceedings. Id.

1981]

ADMIRALTY

release,"' the Fifth Circuit held that there was no mistake made and that
Charpentier had a full understanding of the causes and nature of his disability and their potential ramifications as explained to him by the orthopedist prior to execution of the release. The possibility of an extended
rehabilitation period or the necessity of future medical care were simply
risks which the seaman chose to take in signing the release.4" The court
rejected the argument that the release should be set aside because the
physician had not disclosed his diagnosis of a fifteen percent permanent
disability to the seaman. For Judge Johnson it was sufficient that the seaman was told he would suffer some permanent disability as a result of the
injury, and it was not necessary that he be advised on the specific percentage of disability."
A worker claiming Jones Act seaman status must establish that he was
employed upon a "vessel in navigation.'

7

When a vessel is undergoing

substantial repairs, close questions can arise with respect to whether she
has been withdrawn from navigation. In determining whether a ship
under repair is still in navigation, the courts generally look to two criteria:
(1) the extent and nature of the repair operation, and (2) the entity having custody and control of the ship during the repair period.' The Fifth
Circuit applied this test in upholding a summary judgment for a defendant-employer in Wixom v. Boland Marine & Manufacturing Co. 4" In

Wixom, plaintiff was injured in a fall from a scaffold onto the deck of a
vessel which was undergoing extensive modifications. The facts showed
that the repairs and structural changes being carried out on the vessel
44. There is a distinction in the cases between a mistake of fact with respect to the
extent or outcome of injuries, which generally does not provide the basis for setting aside a
seaman's release, and a mistake regarding the nature of the injuries, which does provide
such a basis. The different treatment appears to rest on the medical distinction between
prognosis, which necessarily involves future facts, and diagnosis, which concerns present
facts. A seaman who signs a release takes his chances that a properly diagnosed injury is the
subject of an overly optimistic prognosis. However, he is not obliged by the maritime law to
take his chances when a diagnosis proves to be incorrect and the seaman is later found to be
suffering from a malady different from that first thought. Robertson v. Douglas S.S. Co., 510
F.2d 829, 836 (5th Cir. 1975).
45. 613 F.2d at 85.
46. The panel qualified this holding by stating that, had the percentage of disability
been substantially greater, the opposite result may have been justified. 613 F.2d at 85 n.1.
47. A three part test serves as an analytical starting point in determining Jones Act
status: (1) whether the employee was working on or in connection with a vessel in navigation; (2) whether the employee had a more or less permanent connection with that vessel or
performed a substantial portion of his work aboard such vessel; and (3) whether the duties
which the employee performed contributed to the function or mission of the vessel. Offshore
Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
48. Warner v. Fish Meal Co., 548 F.2d 1193, 1194 (5th Cir. 1977).
49. 614 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1980).
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were substantial, including the addition of a section to the deckhouse and
a forward mast, and cost some twenty-five million dollars. During a threeyear repair period, the defendant-contractor had full custody of and responsibility for the vessel, the ship's officers and crew having been reassigned. At times, the ship's engine and propeller were dismantled. The
court had little difficulty on these facts in upholding the trial court's finding that the vessel was out of navigation as a matter of law. 0
Similarly, a question of a worker's status under the Jones Act may arise
in an amphibious industrial operation, which can often involve a number
of different contractors and vessels carrying out separate but related
tasks. When an employee is injured during an operation of this nature,
there are often charges and countercharges as to who employed whom,
who controlled whom, and who is responsible for whose negligence, all of
which results in donnybrook-type litigation in which everyone sues everyone and no one is happy with the end result. Such a case was Guidry v.
South Louisiana Contractors, Inc.51 Guidry was employed on a barge
owned by defendant Soloco. The barge was equipped with a large dragline"2 which defendant Messina arranged to rent from Soloco in building
a large pond. Soloco agreed to move the dragline ashore for use by Messina but, because of its value, Soloco required that its own personnel operate the equipment. Messina's union contract required it to employ only
union employees, and for this reason Soloco and Messina agreed to obtain
union cards for Soloco dragline personnel and to put them on Messina's
payroll. Guidry requested to be assigned to dragline work ashore in order
to obtain the higher union wage. While on the shore job, he took his orders from one Hebert, who had also been assigned by Soloco to do the
Messina operation. Guidry was injured on the dragline, allegedly due to
the negligence of Hebert, and sued both Soloco and Messina under the
Jones Act. In typical fashion, both defendants sought indemnity from
each other. The issues on appeal were whether Guidry occupied the status as a Jones Act seaman while working ashore, whether Soloco or Messina was his Jones Act employer," and whether Soloco or Messina was
50. Id. at 957. The term "vessel in navigation" has been held to mean a vessel engaged
as an instrument of commerce and transportation on navigable waters. The strictness with
which this definition has been applied is evidenced by Chief Judge Brown's holding that a
vessel undergoing a sea trial during the final stages of her construction was not "in navigation" for Jones Act purposes. "For there to be a seaman, there must first be a ship. And an
incompleted vessel not yet delivered by the builder is not such a ship. Ship and seaman,
ship and seaworthiness are mutual reflexes." Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d
955, 958 (5th Cir. 1971).
51. 514 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1980).
52. A dragline is a type of large dredging machine.
53. A Jones Act claim requires a showing of an employment relationship, either with a
vessel owner or with some other employer who assigns the worker to a job, creating a vessel

1981]

ADMIRALTY

953

vicariously liable for Hebert's negligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed on
the basis that the issues had not been properly presented to the trial jury
and remanded in an opinion in which the court discussed some of the
principles involved in multi-party litigation arising from amphibious industrial operations.
The first question discussed by Judge Rubin was the effect of Guidry's
shore assignment on his status as a Jones Act seaman.5 The criteria for
determining how long a seaman's status continued during a shoreside assignment includes the duration of the assignment, its relation to the employer's business, and whether the employee is free to accept or reject the
assignment without prejudice to his employment status.55 Next, the court
rejected the argument that Guidry had become Messina's Jones Act seaman on the basis that Messina had no connection with or control over the
barge. Guidry was not working on the barge at the time of his injury, and
the employee had never worked as a seaman for Messina.S1
Judge Rubin then discussed whether Soloco retained its status as the
Jones Act employer of Guidry. When, as in this case, the employee contends that one who does not sign his pay check is in fact his Jones Act
employer," he must show that, considering whatever continuing connection he has with the putative employer, he retains an employment relationship with that employer."
Finally, Judge Rubin considered whether Soloco or Messina was vicariously responsible for Hebert's negligence. The important question in this
regard was whether at the time of the negligent act, Hebert was acting in
connection. Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1975). The employer need
not be the owner or operator of the vessel, provided the employee is assigned to the vessel,
is contributing to the current mission of the vessel, and the employer is supervising the
particular operation which gave rise to the employee's injury. "[I]t would be a strained and
artificial construction of the [Jones] Act to impose any additional requirement that the defendant have operational control over the entire vessel." Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1972). A third person who borrows a worker may
become his employer if the borrowing employer assumes sufficient operational control over
the worker. See Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co., 413 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1969).
54. A seaman does not lose his Jones Act status when he is temporarily assigned to
shoreside duties. See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
55. 614 F.2d at 453.
56. Id. at 453-54.
57. When the worker contends he is the employee of his payroll employer, he may sue
such employer under the Jones Act and leave both-the payroll and borrowing employers to
sort out the ultimate liability between themselves. In that context, the court should focus on
whether the payroll employer has divested himself of control over the employee. Unless
control has been divested, the employee need look no further than the signature on his
check. Id.
58. Id.
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the business of or under the control of Soloco or Messina. Although a
borrowing employer may not become the general employer of the worker,
such an employer may become vicariously liable for the worker's negligence if he assumes control over the acts of the worker and is directing
him at the time liability arises. 59
IV.

WRONGFUL DEATH

A question expressly held open in the Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion in
Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc.60 was whether nonpecuniary damages in
the form of loss of society" may be recovered, under the general maritime
law, in a wrongful death action brought by the survivors of a Jones Act
seaman whose death in state territorial waters was caused by unseaworthiness"2 Despite earlier suggestions by the court to the contrary,6s the
Fifth Circuit answered the question affirmatively in Hlodan v. Ohio Barge
Line, Inc." and Smith v. Ithaca Corp.65 Both actions were suits for the
wrongful deaths of Jones Act seamen, whose deaths were the result of the
unseaworthiness of their vessels while plying territorial waters. Although
the holding in both cases was the same, the court in Hlodan somewhat
summarily stated that "it is clear" that nonpecuniary damages may be
awarded under the circumstances," and it did not provide the full discussion found in the Smith decision. Therefore, our review will center on
Judge Wisdom's opinion in the latter case.
Delores Alston Smith brought suit for the wrongful death of her husband caused by a coronary occlusion suffered shortly after being dis59. Id. The panel noted that a continuation of the general employment, and with it vicarious liability, is indicated, as in this case, by the operation of a machine in a situation in
which the general employer leases the machine as well as an employee to operate it, especially if the machine is of considerable value. Id. at 455 n.6.
60. 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
61. "Society" is said to embrace a wide range of benefits which each family receives from
the others, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort and protection.
The term does not include mental anguish or survivors' grief. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974).
62. 606 F.2d at 528 n.8. In the Ivy decision, the court held that damages for loss of
society may not be recovered by a seaman's survivors in a suit under the Jones Act for
negligence for death occurring in state waters. Id. at 524.
63. In the panel opinion in Ivy, which of course preceded the en banc opinion, Judge
Rubin made clear in a footnote that, in the panel's view, a Jones Act seaman's survivors
would be limited to recovery of pecuniary items even though unseaworthiness under the
general maritime law is found in a suit arising in territorial waters. 585 F.2d 732, 738 n.8
(5th Cir. 1978).
64. 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980).
65. 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. 611 F.2d at 74.

1981]

ADMIRALTY

charged from defendant's tanker. The district court found that the seaman's exposure to benzene fumes aboard the vessel resulted in his death
and held that the tanker was unseaworthy. Damages for nonpecuniary
losses were awarded.17 The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's
finding of unseaworthiness supported recovery for nonpecuniary damage
items.
Judge Wisdom initially held that Ivey provided no guidance on the
question because, in Ivy, the court was influenced for the most part by
the anomaly which would be created by a holding that the beneficiaries of
a seaman may recover nonpecuniary items under the Jones Act when the
negligently caused death occurs in territorial waters but not when the
death occurs in the same manner on the high seas.68 Such a holding would
result in entirely different measures of recovery under the same federal
statute.19 Since recovery in Smith was had under the general maritime
law in addition to the Jones Act, the court was not faced with the same
anomaly.
Having freed itself from any constraints by the Ivy decision, the court
held that the issue of proper damages was controlled by its pre-Higginbotham70 decision in Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co. 7 1 In Landry, the

court held that, when there is liability under both a Jones Act claim and
a general maritime law claim, recovery for nonpecuniary loss is proper7 s
The court's decision in Landry survived Ivy, since in the latter case there
was no finding of unseaworthiness under the general maritime law.
Finally, the court concluded that Landry survived the holding in Higginbotham, since the thrust of the ruling in the latter case was that the
7
general maritime law wrongful death remedy recognized in the Moragne
decision did not extend beyond territorial waters since Congress had already provided a remedy for the death of anyone killed on the high seas
in the form of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). 7 ' Higginbot67. 612 F.2d at 216 n.2.
68. In Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 884
(1978), the Supreme Court held that in cases of wrongful death on the high seas, a decedent's survivors are limited to recovery for pecuniary items of loss authorized under The
Death On The High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976), and may not in addition recover for nonpecuniary items under a general maritime law claim. In Ivy, the Fifth
Circuit held that, since one of the decedents in Higginbotham was found to be a Jones Act
seaman, the Supreme Court's decision was, by implication, a ruling that a Jones Act seaman's beneficiaries may not recover nonpecuniary losses for death on the high seas. 606 F.2d
at 528.
69. 606 F.2d at 529.
70. 436 U.S. 618, rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978). See note 68, supra.
71. 511 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1975).
72. Id. at 143.
73. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
74. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976).
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-ham did not disturb Landry's application of the Moragne remedy to
deaths occurring in state waters.7
In the Higginbotham decision, the Supreme Court left no doubt that,
in cases of wrongful deaths occurring outside United States territorial waters, the elements of a claim under the general maritime law should be
derived from DOHSA. 7s The Fifth Circuit had occasion in Sanchez v.
Loffland Brothers Co.," to illustrate how strongly the appeals court views
the Higginbotham mandate. The issue in Sanchez was whether, in an action brought under the general maritime law for a wrongful death occurring outside United States territorial waters, the two-year DOHSA limitation period or the doctrine of laches should be applied to determine
whether the suit was time-barred."0 Plaintiff filed suit for the death of her

75. 612 F.2d at 226. In an effort to summarize the present state of the law in the Fifth
Circuit with respect to recovery for nonpecuniary items of loss, let us assume a hypothetical
explosion occurring on board a vessel resulting in the deaths of a seaman and a passenger.
The recovery by the decedents' representatives will be based on different standards and in
different amounts, depending upon whether negligence or unseaworthiness is shown and
whether the vessel was in territorial waters or on the high seas at the time of the explosion.
If only negligence is shown, then (1) based on Higginbotham and Ivy, the seaman's representative may not recover for nonpecuniary items no matter whether the explosion occurred
in territorial waters or on the high seas; and (2) under Moragne, the passenger's representative may recover for nonpecuniary items if the explosion occurred in territorial waters, but,
under Higginbotham, may not recover if the explosion occurred on the high seas. On the
other hand, if unseaworthiness is shown, then (1) under Hlodan and Smith, the seaman's
representative may recover for nonpecuniary items if the explosion occurred in territorial
waters. If the explosion occurred on the high seas, however, recovery might be disallowed by
the broad holding in Higginbotham that tle DOHSA limitation should govern all wrongful
death recoveries on the high seas, and survivors may not recover nonpecuniary damages
under a general maritime law claim. Under Higginbotham the passengers' representative
clearly may not recover nonpecuniary items if the explosion occurred on the high seas. However, if the explosion occurred in territorial waters, the passenger's representative may recover such items under Moragne.
76. The Death On The High Seas Act, however, announces Congress' considered
judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries, the limitations period, contributory
negligence, survival, and damages ....
The Act does not address every issue of
wrongful death law,. . . but when it does speak directly to a question, the courts
are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes
meaningless ...
...In the area covered by the statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe
a different measure of damages than to prescribe a different statute of
limitations....
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625.
77. 626 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1980).
78. Maritime claims not covered by statute are not directly subject to any statutory limitation period but only to the equitable doctrine of laches. In deciding whether a claim is
barred, the court will look to whatever it may consider to be the analogous statutory limitation period. The Fifth Circuit rule is that, if the claim is brought after the analogous period
has run, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the delay was excusable or that no prejudice
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seaman husband under both the Jones Act and the general maritime law.
The action was brought more than three years after the cause of action
arose. Although the Jones Act claim was clearly barred by the three-year
limitation period applicable to such claims, 7 ' plaintiff argued that the
timeliness of the general maritime law claim was governed by laches.
The panel discussed a recent Second Circuit decision 0 in which it was
held that only laches barred a general maritime law death claim arising
outside territorial waters, and that the analogous statute of limitation to
be applied was the DOHSA two-year period. However, the Fifth Circuit
thought the Higginbotham mandate more specific and held that the
DOHSA statute of limitations should be applied "in undiluted force" to a
wrongful death claim under the general maritime law which arises outside
territorial waters. 81 Presumably, the court would apply the two-year period as an absolute bar in general maritime law cases of wrongful death
beyond United States waters. However, the court bolstered its decision by
holding that, even if laches should be applied, the two-year analogous
DOHSA period had run, and plaintiff had not shown the requisite absence of prejudice and the reasonableness of the delay.'
V.

HARBOR WORKER CLAIMS

It was in the area of harbor workers' claims that the Supreme Court
made its most significant maritime contribution during this survey period. In American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 83 the Court held that the
wife of a longshoreman nonfatally injured on board a vessel in territorial
waters has a cause of action under the general maritime law for loss of
society. In recognizing the cause of action, the Court overruled by implication that portion of the Fifth Circuit's 1976 decision of Christofferson
5
v. Halliburton Co.," which had denied such a right of action .
resulted to the defendant. If the claim is brought within the period, the defendant must
show the delay was inexcusable and that prejudice resulted by reason of the delay. Barrois
v. Nelda Faye, Inc., 597 F.2d 881, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1979).
79. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), incorporates by reference the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), which contains a three-year limitation period. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976).
80. Public Adm'r v. Angela Compania Naviera, 592 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 443
U.S. 928 (1979).
81. 626 F.2d at 1230. In this case the death occurred on Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela.
DOHSA has been applied when the cause of action arises outside U.S. waters and within the
territorial waters of a foreign sovereign. Public Adm~r v. Angela Compania Naviera, 592 F.2d
58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 928 (1979).
82. 626 F.2d at 1230.
83. 446 U.S. 274 (1980).
84. 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976).
85. Id. at 1149-51.
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Longshoreman Alvez lost an eye while working as a lasher on board
petitioner's vessel in New York harbor and brought suit for negligence
and for breach of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness under the
general maritime law.se His motion for leave to amend the complaint to
add his wife's claim for loss of society was denied on the basis of the
Second Circuit's decision in Igneri v. Compagnie de Transports Oceaniques.8' A decision of the New York Supreme Court" reversed the lower
court, and following an affirmance by the New York Court of Appeals, 0
the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, five members of the Court agreed
that the general maritime law recognized the right of the wife of a longshoreman injured in territorial waters to sue for loss of society. 1 Justice
Brennan first distinguished the Igneri case on the basis that, at the time
of the Second Circuit's decision, there was no clear decisional authority
upholding a general maritime law remedy for loss of society.' However,
subsequent developments altered this legal setting. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Gaudet s held that the general maritime law remedy created by Moragne" included recovery for the loss of society by a decedent's widow. For Justice Brennan, the Gaudet opinion provided
"conclusive decisional recognition" of a right to recover for loss of society
under the general maritime law which was not present when the Igneri
case was decided. 9' Although Gaudet was a wrongful death action, the
Court held that, once it has been recognized that the general maritime
law provides a remedy for loss of society, there is no valid reason to dif86. The Court pointed out in a footnote that Alvez's injury occurred prior to the effective date of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), which abolished a longshoreman's
right to sue for breach of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)
(1976). 446 U.S. at 276 n.2.
87. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
88. 59 A.D.2d 883, 399 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1977).
89. 46 N.Y.2d 634, 389 N.E.2d 461 (1979).
90. 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
91. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, expressed his continued belief that Sea-Land
Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), which recognized a wife's cause of action for
loss of society under the general maritime law, was wrongly decided. Id. at 595 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). But he concurred in the judgment on the ground that he saw no rational basis
for distinguishing between fatal and nonfatal injuries for purposes of a wife's claim for loss
of society. 446 U.S. at 286. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist,
dissented on the basis that the decision below was not final and the writ of certiorari should
have been dismissed. Id.
92. 446 U.S. at 280.
93. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
94. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
95. 446 U.S. at 280-81.
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ferentiate between fatal and nonfatal injuries. The fact that the longshoreman remains alive, although injured, is logically irrelevant.9 6
Petitioner had argued that Gaudet should be limited to the wrongful
death context since neither DOHSA nor the Jones Act recognize a right
to recover for loss of society. Rejecting this apparent statutory preemption contention, Justice Brennan stated that neither statute foreclosed
recognition by the general maritime law of a right of action for loss of
society. 97 Although the Supreme Court had recently held in Higginbotham' s that DOHSA preempts the general maritime law in cases of death
on the high seas, the Court stated that Higginbotham never intimated
that the preclusive effect of DOHSA extended into territorial waters and
that Gaudet still governs there." Finally, the Court found persuasive the
fact that some forty-two states now permit a wife to recover damages for
loss of society as a result of a nonfatal injury to her husband. 100
Attorney's fees was the subject of another maritime contribution made
by the Supreme Court during this survey period. When a harbor worker
brings suit against a shipowner under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act 0 1 (hereafter Longshoremen's Act or Act), after receiving compensation benefits from his employer, the harbor
worker's recovery from the shipowner is subject to the employer's lien in
the amount of the compensation payment.102 Since reimbursement of the
employer is thus achieved through the efforts of the harbor worker's attorney, should the employer be required to pay a reasonable fee to the
worker's counsel? The Supreme Court responded in the negative in
Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,103 in which it held that a ste-

vedore-employer's lien against a harbor worker's recovery may not be reduced by an amount representing the stevedore's proportionate share of
the worker's legal expenses.
Following a shipboard injury, longshoreman Bloomer received benefits
96. Id. at 281. In discussing the double liability issue in Gaudet, the Supreme Court
stated decedent's prior recovery did not include damages for his dependent's loss of society,
which losses "could not accrue until the decedent's death." 414 U.S. at 591-92. In the Christofferson decision, the Fifth Circuit seized on this language to infer an intention by the
Court in Gaudet to limit the decision to wrongful death situations. 534 F.2d at 1150-51. The
Supreme Court dismissed this idea, stating that no such limitation was implicit. 446 U.S. at
281 n.8.
97. 446 U.S. at 281-82.
98. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 884
(1978), discussed at note 68 supra.
99. 446 U.S. at 282.
100. Id. at 284 n.11.
101. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
102. This lien is one of judicial rather than legislative creation. Allen v. Texaco, Inc., 510
F.2d 977, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1975).
103. 445 U.S. 74 (1980).
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from his employer's workers' compensation carrier. He thereafter brought
suit against the shipowner under the Longshoremen's Act, and the compensation carrier intervened to assert its lien against any recovery. After
settling his suit with the shipowner, Bloomer moved for summary judgment against the compensation carrier asking that the carrier's lien be
reduced by an amount representing its proportionate share of the fee
charged by the longshoreman's attorney. The district court denied the
motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits with respect to the
issue.' o4
Longshoreman Bloomer's main argument was based on the "common
fund" doctrine which provides that a lawyer who creates a fund for the
benefit of another party is entitled to reasonable compensation from that
party for his efforts.105 In an eight to one decision, the Court rejected this
argument based on the language and history of the Longshoremen's Act.
Under the Act, a longshoreman receiving compensation benefits under an
award is given six months within which to bring suit against a third
party. If he fails to sue within this period, the longshoreman's claim is
assigned by operation of law to the stevedore-employer. 101 In a suit by the
employer against the third party, the employer is entitled under the Act
to reimbursement for the compensation benefits paid to the longshoremen, including all reasonable attorney's fees.107 Although the Act does
not expressly provide a distribution scheme in a suit brought by the longshoreman himself, Justice Marshall stated that there was no reason to
believe Congress intended that a different distribution be applied in such
cases. If the stevedore-employer is to recover all of his legal fees when he
obtains the recovery, the same result should obtain when the longshoreman brings the action. ' "
With respect to the legislative history of the Longshoremen's Act, the
Court found it significant that, when the Act was amended in 1959 and
1972, Congress was fully aware of lower federal court decisions holding
that a stevedore should not be required to pay part of the longshoreman's
attorney's fees, and Congress elected not to disturb the existing judicial
rule. 09

104. Id. at 77. The Fifth Circuit has adopted what it calls a "fairness formula," under
which the court examines each case to determine whether the plaintiff can justly be asked to
bear the total legal expense of his recovery alone. Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappij
Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (5th Cir. 1978).
105. 445 U.S. at 77.
106. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976).
107. 33 US.C. § 933(e)(1)(A) (1976).
108. 445 U.S. at 78-79.
109. Id.
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Bloomer also argued that, after the 1972 amendments to the Act which
abolished the shipowner's cause of action against the stevedore,' 0 the
longshoreman and the stevedore have a common pecuniary interest in the
harbor worker's recovery against the shipowner, and therefore the stevedore should pay its share of the legal expenses. Justice Marshall rejected
this notion, holding that such a requirement on the stevedore would be
irreconcilable with the purpose of the amendments, which is to bring
about conservation of stevedore resources so as to ensure compensation
awards to longshoremen." '
Finally, the Court observed that if Bloom's theory was accepted, an injured longshoreman would end up recovering the full amount of his damages against the shipowner and, in addition, a supplement consisting of
the stevedore's contribution to his attorney's fees. The Court referred to
this as a "windfall" over and above the amount the longshoreman received as compensation for his injury.12
In lone dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed concern that the longshoreman was getting the short end of the judicial stick. After all, it is the
longshoreman who takes the risk and worry of the litigation and, if he
recovers enough, the stevedore is home free and never need lift a finger."1 8
This flies in the face of what the justice described as the chief purpose of
the 1972 amendments-to benefit the longshoreman. For Justice Black' 4
mun, the Congressional intent "has been stood on its head."
Many of the legal issues arising in cases decided under the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act concern the appropriate standard of
care to be applied to the shipowner."' A controversial subissue has involved the question whether, and under what circumstances, the shipowner may be held liable for an open and obvious condition which causes
injury. The issue was first addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Gay v. Ocean
Transport & Trading, Ltd.," 6 in which the court relied on section 343A
110.

33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).

111.

445 U.S. at 81.

112. Id. at 87. It is difficult to see how the longshoreman would receive a windfall under
these circumstances. As pointed out by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, any fees the longshoreman must pay to his attorney necessarily reduce the amount of his adjudicated recovery. Thi* deficit would be partially reduced, but never eliminated, if the stevedore paid a
proportionate share of the legal expenses. Id. at 95 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 89.
114. Id. at 95.
115. It appears that the Supreme Court soon may be directing some badly needed guidance in this area. The Court has granted certiorari in Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation
Co., 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979), which sets forth the applicable Ninth Circuit standard.
446 U.S. 934 (1980).
116. 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977).
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of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 17 in formulating the rule that a

shipowner is not liable for an injury caused by a condition which is open
and obvious to the longshoreman unless the condition is such that the
shipowner should anticipate that the longshoreman cannot appreciate or
avoid it even though aware of it. 1 In McCullough v. Steamship Coppename,11 9 the court applied this rule quite narrowly in upholding a summary judgment for the shipowner.
The facts in McCullough showed that the plaintiff-longshoreman was
injured while loading cargo on board a vessel in New Orleans. In order to
provide circulation under the cargo, the deck of the ship was covered with
wooden gratings, some of which were cracked and broken. Although noticing the broken gratings, the longshoremen continued to work and made
no complaint to their foreman. While the plaintiff was pulling a loaded
cart in the ship's 'tween deck, the cart struck a broken board, tipped over,
and knocked plaintiff into an open hatch. Following discovery, the district court granted a summary judgment for the defendant shipowner.
Although there was evidence of poor lighting in the ship's hold and a
lack of a safety net around the open hatch, both of which conditions constituted violations of the longshoring regulations, 1 0 the panel followed
stevedore, rather than the
the Fifth Circuit rule that it is the duty of12the
1
shipowner, to comply with the regulations.
With respect to the "open and obvious" issue, the plaintiff argued that
a jury should decide whether the risk of harm created by the broken gratings was one that required the shipowner to take protective action under
117. Under the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToR's § 343A, a possessor of land is not liable
for physical harm to invitees caused by a condition the danger of which is known or obvious
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
118. 546 F.2d at 1241-42. In setting this standard, the court embraced the standard
formulated the year before by the Second Circuit in Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d
505, 508 (2d Cir. 1976).
119. This case appeared at 608 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1979) of West Publishing Company's
advance sheets. Prior to its publication in the official reporter, it was withdrawn by the
court. No explanation was given for its withdrawal. However, the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit to hear a case involving similar issues. Santos v.
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 446 U.S. 934
(1980).
120. United States Department of Labor Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1918.92, 1918.31, 1918.35 (1980).
121. See Bossard v. Exxon Corp., 559 F.2d 1040, 1042 (5th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 333 (5th Cir. 1977). This rule has not been uniformly
applied by the circuits, some courts holding that the regulations are binding on the shipowner when he knows or should know of a violation, see Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers,
Ltd., 605 F.2d 438, 446 (9th Cir. 1979), or that violations can be "indicia of negligent activity" on the part of a shipowner. Julien v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 1977 A.M.C. 241, 246 (E.D.
La.).
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RESTATEMENT section 343A. Judge Tjoflat rejected this contention, hold-

ing that the broken boards were apparent, open, obvious, correctible, and
within the control of the stevedore. The court was persuaded by the record in the case, which showed that the plaintiff had observed the broken
gratings for a considerable period of time but had failed to report the
potentially dangerous condition. The panel appeared to place the entire
burden on the stevedore by holding that, even if the ship's officers or crew
had knowledge of the condition, the stevedore nevertheless was capable of
correcting the situation, and it was the stevedore's negligence in failing to
rig the required safety net which allowed the plaintiff to be thrown into
the open hatch.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Godbold made the point that,
given the facts that the grating covered the entire deck area where the
longshoremen were required to load the vessel, and that they necessarily
had to stand and walk on the boards, a jury issue was created as to what
a longshoreman in plaintiff's position could have done to avoid the danger. The judge's point seems to be valid. If, as held in Gay, the shipowner
may be held liable when an open and obvious dangerous condition is such
that the shipowner should anticipate that it cannot be avoided by the
longshoremen, the facts in the McCullough case clearly present a jury
issue. In order to resolve the question in favor of the shipowner, several
factual issues would have to be considered, to wit: could the shipowner
anticipate that a longshoreman could perform his work even in the face of
the broken gratings; could the shipowner anticipate that the stevedore
would replace the gratings; could the shipowner anticipate the longshoreman would refuse to work unless the condition was corrected. According
to Judge Godbold, the record was silent on these issues, and the case was
one which should have been submitted to the jury.
One of the express purposes of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoreman's Act was to place an employee injured on board a vessel in the same
position he would be in if he were injured in non-maritime employment
2 8 relied on this
ashore. 2 " The defendant in Bush v. Oceans International
purpose to argue that the land-based Texas statute of limitations should
be applied to bar plaintiff-longshoreman's claim, which was brought just
under three years from the date of his injury. The district court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment and certified the limitations
issue to the Fifth Circuit. The appeals court held that, in light of the
long-standing nature of the rule that the timeliness of harbor workers'
suits is governed by laches, l " if Congress had intended to abolish the rule
122. H.R. RzP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. reprinted in [1972J U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4698, 4698-99.
123. 621 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1980).
124. See, e.g., Watz v. Zapata Offshore Co., 500 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1974); Flowers v.
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with passage of the 1972 amendments, vigorous discussion would have
taken place. As it was, there was no hint of such a Congressional purpose.1 35 The court held specifically that in 1972 amendment cases the
timeliness of the action must be determined under the traditionally-applied doctrine of laches, and that the analogous limitation period to be
employed in determining the laches question is the three-year Jones Act
period. 1 s

Savannah Mach. & Foundry Co., 310 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1962).
125. 621 F.2d at 210. The panel cited two recent Supreme Court cases in which the high
court rejected arguments that the 1972 amendments had abolished traditional maritime law
principles. In Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979), the
Court held that the admiralty principle that a shipowner can be required to pay all the
damages sustained by a longshoreman, even though the stevedore's negligence contributed
to the injury, had not been scuttled by the amendments. In Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 445 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court upheld the traditional rule that a stevedore-employer,
having paid compensation benefits to an injured longshoreman, is entitled to assert its full
lien on a recovery had by the longshoreman in a suit against a shipowner and is not required
to reduce its lien by any portion of the longshoreman's legal expenses. See Part V, Harbor
Worker Claims, especially text accompanying notes 101-14 supra.
126. 621 F.2d at 211. It is to be noted that the laches issue in maritime personal injury
and death cases may be destined for the briny deep. Late in 1980, there was passed into law
a uniform three-year statute of limitations, to apply in all cases of personal ?hjury and death
arising from maritime torts. Act of Oct. 6, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-382, 94 Stat. 1525 (to be
codified in 46 U.S.C. § 763(a)).

